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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellee/Respondent, 
v. 
RALPH LEVIN, 
Case No. 20050001-SC 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2^2(3)(a) and (5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affording the trial court deference in the 
application of the underlying facts to the legal determination of whether Levin was in 
custody for Fifth Amendment and Miranda purposes? On certiorari review, this Court 
reviews the decision of the court of appeals non-deferentially for correctness. State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, fl 1, 103 P.3d 699 (citations omitted). "One of the components of 
the court of appeals's decision that [this Court] examinees] for correctness is the standard 
of review which it applied to the ruling of the trial court. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, fS9 
13 P.3d 576. This issue is preserved in the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals. State v. 
Levin, 2004 UT App 396, 103 P.3d 846. 
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STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
In State v, Levin, 2004 UT App 396, 101 P.3d 846, the Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to suppress by utilizing a deferential 
standard of review. This Court subsequently granted Levin's petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
B, Lower Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Ralph Levin was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on June 21, 
2001, with: possession or use of marijuana with a prior conviction, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-
5(1); and having an open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in \iolation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.20(2) (R. 2). The State filed an amended information on 
December 24, 2001, amending the open container in a vehicle charge to a class B 
misdemeanor pursuant to Utah County Code § 23-2-10 (R. 43). 
On December 20, 2001, Levin filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting that any 
statements elicited pursuant to interrogation should be suppressed because he was subject 
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to custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights per Miranda, including his 
right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (R. 29-30). On May 22, 2002, the trial court denied Levin's motion to 
suppress (R. 72,110). The trial court determined that Levin was not "in custody" and not 
subject to interrogation for Fifth Amendment and Miranda purposes (R. 110-18). 
A jury trial was held on May 22, 2002 and Levin was found guilty of possession of 
marijuana with a prior conviction and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 150, 151, 
294). At the beginning of trial, Levin renewed his motion to suppress any incriminating 
statements made on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights and Miranda (R. 293: 7) 
On August 12, 2002, Levin was placed on probation for 24 months and ordered to 
serve 80 days in the work diversion program at the Utah County Jail (R. 182). 
On September 13, 2002, Levin filed a notice of appeal in the Fourth District Court 
(R. 209). On January 23, 2003, Levin filed a Petition for post-conviction relief because 
his trial counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal in this matter (R. 255-58). The 
trial court granted the motion for post-conviction relief and Levin was re-sentenced on 
March 24, 2003 (R. 267, 282). Levin filed a timely notice of appeal on April 9, 2003 (R. 
290). 
On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Levin's 
motion to suppress. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in finding that 
Levin was not subjected to "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda, but agreed that 
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Levin was not in "custody" at the time the interrogation took place. State v Levin, 2004 
UT App 396, <H's 11-12, 101 P.3d 846. In reaching this holding, the court of appeals 
employed a standard of review which afforded the trial court "a degree of discretion" in 
the application of the underlying facts to the appropriate legal standard. Id. at f 7 and f20. 
Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that "the question of whether a police 
statement is so accusatory as to coerce a suspect into an unwanted confession is a 
question of degree for which the trial court is best suited to decide. Therefore, in 
determining whether Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory that it would 'affect 
how a reasonable person ... would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action,' we 
afford the trial court considerable discretion." Id. at 121 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 
511 U.S. 318,325, 114S.CL 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)). A copy of the court of 
appeals' decision is included in the Addenda. 
On April 5, 2005, this Court granted certiorari review on the following issue: 
"Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in reviewing the 
district court's determination that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of 
Miranda protections." A copy of this Court's order is included in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Levin asserts that several significant facts were left out of the court of appeals' 
opinion. Accordingly, Levin also includes a complete statement of the facts from both 
the suppression hearing and the jury trial. 
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A Statement of facts set forth in the court of appeals' opinion at 2004 UT App 
In May 2001, Dei v s ' - • i 
when he noticed that the registration tags of a convertible car parked on the suie of • r 
road were expired (R. 292: 17-19N- TT .lied uy- K 'h ind the c a r and walked to die cor on 
I ii'ii ii'ii n<Mjly ill i|l . -,..;. ., . . ., tU > convertible roof was dc-yn 
and, while standing beside'' .,- .t. i 
view and asked the occupants for i denL^^on (R. 292: 20). I Jpon a subsequent se«u ch 
oi ilk. vehicle, he found a "socket" tool that had been used to smoke marijuana and 
several small IMJJ.S umtdiniiig iiiaujiKiiia HI a backpack.(R. 292: 21). 
Deputy Keith radioed u.wdv *> ?• *. *»- *» 
23). When the officers arrived they conducted several field ^obiiety i^u> that indicated 
thu; .i»c dmei, i.evin, had been smoking marijuana (R. 292: 31; R. 294: 73-74, 78-79). 
Hnwrvu , Depimh knll ilolu mined thai 1 cvin was not under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs (R. 294: 36). Deputy Keith testitV. 
36). 
Deputy Keith "pulled j Levin] aside" and questioned him out of the presence of the 
otln f H f". passengers «R. *!'M 'M A lun Deputy Keith asked Lovm if he had been 
aiiiuking marijuana, Levin responded tlmt he 1iu«< I m m 11.' H>" ' i 11 11 1 V| \ ir m 
"f atted down" Levin but found no marijuana on his person (R. 294: 56). Keith also 
detected no scent of marijuana or alcohol on Levin (R. 294: 56, 70). At some point, 
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Deputy Keith stated that he knew Levin had been smoking marijuana, to which Levin 
responded he had (R. 292: 26). In fact, Deputy Keith repeatedly questioned Levin and 
then told him, "there was no doubt in my mind that you' vc been smoking marijuana" (R. 
294: 37, 59). Levin was detained at the side of the road for one to one-and-a-half hours 
(R. 294: 58-59, 61). 
B. Statement of facts from testimony at the suppression hearing. 
Deputy Wayne Keith of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was on patrol on May 2, 
2001, on the dike road that goes around the Provo airport (R. 292: 17-18). Keith 
observed a convertible vehicle parked in a turn-out with an expired registration (R. 292: 
18, 19, 29). Keith stopped behind the vehicle "to talk with the driver to see if he was 
aware that his registration was expired" (Id.). Keith approached the three occupants and 
identified the driver as Ralph Levin (R. 292: 19, 20). Keith did not activate his overhead 
lights or block the vehicle with his car (R. 292: 18-19). 
As Keith was speaking with Levin, he noticed some open containers of alcohol in 
the vehicle (R. 292: 20). Keith had the occupants exit the vehicle look for additional 
open containers (R. 292: 20). At this point none of the occupants were placed in hand-
cuffs and Keith's weapon was not drawn (R. 292: 21). However, Keith also testified that 
none of the occupants was free to leave the scene (R. 292: 30). 
Keith searched the vehicle and found a socket with burnt and residual marijuana in 
a compartment between the driver and passenger seat (R. 292: 21). Keith continued his 
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search and found marijuana and other related items in a backpack that belonged to one of 
lIn" olliei individuals, Richard Johnson (R. 292: 22-23). 
Annlhi mi i IMI|III ml deputies uiusrd lu a^ul kulli I {LL 1 U Keith u>ndikled 
field sobriety tests on Levin and the other deputies did some dr ^ r .>omtiru * o* 
him (R. 292: 23, ?' 1 \ Keith testified that Levin passed the field sobriety tests and that he 
, Liouig t-; ue arrested lor UU1 U\ -92: 24) Levin was still not free to leave (R. 
Keith asked Levin about his knowledge of the socket in, the vehicle an)1 wheih i h • 
had, used it to smoke marijuana (R. 29,2: 25, 35). Levin denied any knowledge or use of it 
(R,„. 292: 25, 35) I he other deputies, however, informed Keith, that they believed that 
Levin was und-T-thiMnHiw- . ."s. ... . 11,<
 (> j^ («"i, \ \ > . -n cross-
examination that it is possible for some prescribed medications to cause impairm* 
is similar to that caused by marijuana (R , 292: 33), 
Keith again asked Li \ ih about the socket and Levin/again denied, any knowledge 
of it (R. 292: 2d), Keith llicii ml In I i " iiiiii ' riii'ir' mi ill in ill nil iiiiii m> iiiiiiiiiiiill ih.il you' ve 
been Miioking marijuana" (R. 292: 26 j . Keith testified thai tlii& was phrased a^> a 
statement to Levin and not a questii -n T\ 292: 26' K Ith testified that he did not expect 
I - . * . fowever according t^ Keith, I evin 
respouu^u mat "he h.v l her 
occupant] had smoked out of a pipe that I had not located at that point 
27). On cross-examination,, however, Keith at one point, testified that suspects often make 
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replies to comments (R. 292: 37, 39). 
The trial court denied Levin's motion to suppress and concluded that Levin was 
not in custody for purposes of Miranda (R. 110-18). 
C. Statement of facts from testimony during the jury trial. 
1. Testimony of Sheriff Wayne Keith 
Wayne Keith is a police officer with the Utah County Sheriffs Office (R. 294: 16). 
On May 1, 2001, Keith was patrolling an area just north of the Provo Boat Harbor near 
Utah Lake and where he observed a parked vehicle with an expired registration sticker 
(R. 294: 17). Three people were in the convertible and Keith parked behind them and 
spoke with Levin, the driver (R. 294: 17-18). 
Keith saw "several open containers" as he was speaking with the three men and 
asked them to stop out of the vehicle "so I could do a more thorough search" for 
additional evidence (R. 294: 19-20). 
Keith found several containers behind the driver's seat and also looked in the 
vehicle's center console in between the driver and passenger seat (R. 294: 19-20). As 
Keith opened the console, he smelled burnt marijuana and observed that a ratchet or 
socket tool had been used to smoke marijuana and it still contained burnt and unburnt 
marijuana (R. 294: 22). 
Keith continued to search the car for evidence and picked up a backpack belonging 
to the passenger sitting in the back seat, Richard Johnson (R. 294: 26). As Keith picked 
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up the backpack, Johnson immediately said that the backpack was his but that there was 
nothing illegal in the backpack (R. 294: 26). Keith searched the backpack and found 
three baggies containing marijuana and some pills (R. 294: 21). 
Keith i ili'lif il hi! h ii l.ii|i .imi iln il i imdurieil nelil *nl>iiei) li'Mh on Lv\ in IO 
determine whether he was under the influence which would affect hia dn Mr. : 
33), The other officers actually arrived prior \o the lime Keith conducted the field 
sobriety tests on Lev in (R. 294:: Atter Levin underwent the field sobriety tests, K; "4l 
detenu ined that he \ \ as not m mde * • 
other officers also conducted field sobriety tests on Levin (R. 294: 57). 
Keith then "pulled [Levin] aside" and questioned him out of the presence oi „__ 
••:, ^scjigci N , • , . a asked Levin about the socket and marijuana and 
Levin repeatedly insisted 
had not smoked marijuana out oi the socket (R. 294: 3'/,. i^ idi "patted down " Levm out 
found no m...arijuana on his'person (R. 294: 56). Keith also detected no scent of marijuana 
or alcohol on I = • i in (R 29' I : 56, 1 0) Keith could not rememK i ii Levin told him that he 
was takini: medication lor a shoulder ni|iii r, hill Hi HI;''III I ill vwiis "possihle11 (K '"'M l\ 'I 
Keith continued to question Levin and then told him "there wras no doubt in my . 
mind that you've been smoking marijuana" (R. 294: 37, 59V A! no point did Keith read 
1 • • h . ^ciUiuiathehao .atvcu fca roupleof h^N" 
with Johnson, > •* '• - ., . .
 ; 
...possessed any marijuana (R. 294: 37-38). Levin told Keith that he did not sm< :>t; e < );i i t • : f 
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the socket, but that he had smoked marijuana out of a pipe that Keith had not yet found 
(R. 294: 40). 
Keith questioned Winger about smoking marijuana, but admitted that the 
questioning was not extensive (R. 294: 41). Keith also read Johnson his rights pursuant 
to Miranda and questioned him regarding the marijuana, however neither Winger or 
Johnson were required to undergo any field sobriety tests (R. 294: 41, 235). Johnson 
admitted to smoking marijuana with Levin but was also adamant that Winger did not 
smoke any (R. 294: 41). Johnson originally stated that they had smoked from the ratchet, 
but then stated that they smoked from a pipe which he threw into the lake (EL 294: 41-42). 
But later, Johnson told Keith that he thought he had smoked it alone and that Levin did 
not smoke at all (R. 294: 42, 237-38). 
Keith testified that he believed he had Levin and the other two stopped for about 
an hour before they were free to go (R. 294: 58-59, 61). When Levin began to drive 
away, another officer noticed a pipe underneath the convertible and Keith asked Johnson 
if that was the pipe he used to smoke the marijuana in and Johnson said yes (R. 294: 64-
65). 
On rebuttal, Keith testified that he performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on 
Levin before the other officer arrived (R. 249: 221). Keith stated that Levin had no 
involuntary twitching of the eye (R. 249: 222). However, Keith testified that this was 
consistent with marijuana use (R. 249: 222). Keith later admitted that this test is 
performed to see whether a person is impaired from drinking alcohol, and because Levin 
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only drank a few wine coolers it was possible that he would not have the involuntary 
iwii 'Jimgtk. 2 49:243-34). 
2. 1 est in imp nl < Hln i i '1 Il i I < hlon 
Todd Ortoii is a police officer wm * . . . .. 
certified drug recognition expert or DRE (R. 294: 71, 74). A URE is an officer that has 
^mi. lii.uu^ii uaiiiiiig u/ learn the different categories of drugs and their effects on the 
Orton testified that marijuana use causes a person" \ \ nils* it»\(trn 1 up .tinI IIM > 
causes a lack of convergence, or inability to cross one's eyes and remained focused (R. 
1 v • • ion also testified that hydroctodone or similar' pain relieving drags have 
tin; opposite cilivl tht/y ilmvasp a pci^on's pulse uhd constrict aperson's pupils,, causing 
a convergence of the eyes (R. 294: 77). 
. Orton responded to Keith's call for assistance on May 1, 2001 (R. 294: 71). When 
Oi l«i i i ai ii vcd nl the scene, Keith asked tiim,. to perform some tests on. Levin (R 294: 72), 
Ortoii look I e\ i>» pnl ,'• ,\"*\ 'l"\slifrd (In! H was l.islci llian normal, about 120 beats per 
minute (R. 294: 72-73, 90). Orton also tested Levin for a lack, of ^onwrp/nec t A I he ryes 
/p oo/j- ^^ T ^ ~ tests a person's ability 10 touch their finger to their nose to see if their 
\c- • ' i • .i, . * ^t^rj stated that Levin " i ; ld . not cross his eyes or 
IIUIU nit '" ^u\ wa<? consistent with 
.,—Lid use; however some people cannot cross Ihni , \ <M, i( i1 • F '' i ' v. '', 
also testified that, is was impossible for a person on pain medication to have a hitih p» . 
1 1 
rate and not be able to converge his eyes (R. 294: 80). Orton testified that a lack of 
convergence only results from a person using marijuana, PCP, or inhalants, unless that 
individual cannot cross her eyes anyway (R. 294: 80, 86-89, 106). Orton admitted that 
other things might cause a higher than normal pulse rate, but only running or drugs would 
cause a pulse rate of 120 (R. 294: 90). 
Orton was not sure if Levin told him that he had taken medication that day on an 
empty stomach (R. 294: 107-08). Orton also admitted that he was unsure what effect 
several different medications would simultaneously have on the body, but he told Keith 
that he thought Levin was under the influence of marijuana (R. 294: 92-93, 95). 
Orton testified that he did not conduct a full DRE exam on Levin (R. 294: 82). A 
full exam would take about an hour and a half and Orton only spent "maybe, five minutes" 
with Levin (R. 294: 82-83). A full exam also consists of blood and urine samples to 
identify what drugs are in the body, which Orton did not do (R. 294: 94, 97-98). 
On redirect examination, Orton testified that some muscle relaxants are 
depressants and that some depressants also cause a lack of convergence (R. 294: 103-04). 
3. Testimony of Officer Charles Beeder 
Charles Beeder is a police officer with the Utah County Sheriffs Department (R. 
294: 110). Beeder testified that he is also a drug recognition expert, or DRE (R. 294: 
112). 
Beeder was with Orton on May 1, 2001, and they both responded to Keith's call 
for backup assistance (R. 294: 111). Keith told Beeder that he had "three individuals in 
12 
the vehicle out of the vehicle, and he had done a search of the vehicle and come up with 
some evidence, and he wanted us to check the driver [Levin] to see if there might be a 
possibility that he might be under the influence of drugs" (R. 294: 111). 
Beeder assisted Orton conduct the eye convergence test on Levin by watching 
Orton (R. 294: 112,120). Beeder also did not test Levin's pulse, and after a leading 
question by the prosecutor agreed that it could have been around 120, but he did not 
remember (R. 294: 114). Beeder testified that a person that has consumed alcohol and is 
also under the influence of Lortab or hydrocodone would have a low pulse rate and 
constricted pupils, or no lack of convergence (R. 294: 118). But Beeder also testified that 
a high level of alcohol consumption could cause a lack of convergence (R. 294: 122). 
Beeder thought Levin was under the influence of marijuana, but he could not be sure (R. 
294: 119). 
Beeder testified that a full DRE exam includes blood and urine samples to pinpoint 
what drugs are in a persons system (R. 294: 124). Levin was not subjected to a blood or 
urine test (R. 294: 124). Beeder also did not know what effects a cortisone injection 
would have on a person (R. 294: 129). 
4. Testimony of Richard Johnson 
Richard Johnson and Ralph Levin are friends (R. 294: 133). On May 1, 2001, 
Levin, Johnson, and Winger went to Utah Lake together (R. 294: 133). When Levin 
picked Johnson up, Johnson had his backpack with him which contained marijuana (R. 
294: 133). Levin did not know that Johnson had marijuana with him (R. 294: 134). 
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When they arrived at the lake, Levin and Winger went for a walk (R. 294: 134). 
Winger is handicapped so Levin assisted him (R. 294: 134). Johnson stayed at the vehicle 
and sat in the front and listened to some CD's and also began to smoke some marijuana 
while Levin and Winger were away (R. 294: 134, 134). Johnson used the ratchet tool to 
smoke the marijuana, which he brought with him (R. 294: 135-36). As Levin and Winger 
were returning to the car, he hurried and placed the ratchet in the console and went to the 
back of the car because he did not want them to see him (R. 294: 136, 138). 
Johnson also admitted that he also brought the pipe the police found on the ground 
under the car (R. 294: 136). Johnson explained that the pipe was his and when the police 
came, he shoved the pipe inside his pants and that is must have fallen out when he was 
outside being questioned (R. 294: 136-37). 
When Officer Keith arrived, he asked them to step out of the car and then he 
searched Johnson's backpack (R. 294: 139). Johnson admitted that the marijuana was his 
(R. 294: 141). Keith told Johnson that Levin told him that they had smoked marijuana 
together, but Johnson denied this (R. 294: 141). Johnson told Keith that Levin did not 
smoke any (R. 294: 141). 
5. Testimony of Ralph Levin 
On May 1, 2001, Ralph Levin picked up his ex-brother-in-law, Michael Winger, to 
"get him out of his apartment and let him get a breath of fresh air" (R. 249: 166). Winger 
recently sustained an injury causing partial paralysis and Levin routinely checked on him 
to make sure he was doing all right (R. 249: 166). 
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They both decided to go down to Utah Lake near the airport and watch the planes 
take off and land (R. 249: 167). On the way, they stopped at a gas station and purchased 
a six-pack of beer and a four-pack of wine coolers (R. 249: 167). As Levin walked out of 
the gas station, he saw Johnson in the parking lot (R. 249: 167-68). They all decided to 
go to the lake together and Johnson got in the back seat (R. 249: 175). 
In February 2001, Levin re-injured his shoulder in an automobile accident (R. 249: 
169-70). He originally tore his rotator cuff which required surgery in 1999 (R. 249: 169). 
As a result of this recent re-injury, Levin was prescribed Lortab, a pain medication, 
methocarbamol, an anti-inflammatory, and a muscle relaxant (R. 249: 170-71). His 
doctor was also giving him cortisone injections (R. 249: 170). On the morning of this 
incident, Levin took both Lortab and methocarbamol on an empty stomach (R. 249: 174). 
When they arrived at the lake, they just sat around for five or ten minutes (R. 249: 
175). Winger wanted to stretch his legs, so Levin helped him walk down the road (R. 
249: 175). Winger's paralysis allowed him to walk with some help, but he takes 
medication to help with his balance (R. 249: 166-67). As they walked, Levin drank two 
of the wine coolers and Winger drank one (R. 249: 176). 
After about twenty or thirty minutes of walking, Levin and Winger came back to 
the car (R. 249: 177). Levin could see that Johnson was smoking out of a pipe and 
noticed him trying to put it away as they got closer (R. 249: 177). 
About twenty minutes later, Officer Keith pulled up (R. 249: 178). Keith informed 
Levin that his registration was expired and asked to see his driver's license (R. 249: 178). 
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Keith then noticed a few open containers in the car and began to search the car (R. 249: 
178-79). During the search, Keith found a socket in the center console (R. 249: 179). 
Levin told Keith that the socket was not his and that he did not knowr anything 
about it (R. 249: 180). Keith then asked him if he had been smoking marijuana, and 
Levin said, "it's not mine, and I don't smoke marijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana" 
(R. 249: 181). During the next hour to hour-and-a-half, Keith continued to ask Levin if 
he had been smoking marijuana and Levin "told him pretty adamantly" that he had not (R. 
249: 181). 
Keith eventually performed field sobriety tests on Levin, which he passed (R. 249: 
181-82). Then two other officers came and also performed a few tests on him (R. 249: 
182). Officer Orton told Levin, "Look, I know you're on something. I know you've been 
smoking marijuana, and I know you're on drugs." (R. 249: 183). Keith also accused 
Levin and told him that he knew he had been smoking marijuana (R. 249: 183). Levin 
again denied these accusations and told him that he had an injury and was on pain 
medications (R. 249: 183). At no point did the officers read Levin his rights per Miranda 
(R. 249: 182-84). 
Keith then told Levin that he could impound his car and take him to jail (R. 249: 
14). Levin knew that Winger needed to get back home in order to take his medication 
and he did not want his vehicle impounded (R. 249: 184). In order to get back home and 
end the prolonged questioning, Levin finally said, "Fine. I took a couple of hits" (R. 249: 
184). 
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Keith then gave Levin a citation for marijuana and having open containers in his 
car (R. 249: 185). Levin initially refused to sign it, saying he was not guilty of the 
marijuana charge (R. 249: 185). Levin admitted to having the open containers in his car 
but he again adamantly denied possessing or using the marijuana (R. 249: 185). Keith 
then told him to sign the ticket or go to jail (R. 249: 185). Levin then signed the ticket (R. 
249: 185). Levin testified that they were detained by the officers for 60-90 minutes (R. 
294: 181). 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Levin, "Have you ever been charged 
with marijuana possession before?" (R. 249: 210). Then he asked, "And in fact, on 
February 2, 2000, did you plead no contest to possessing less than a pound of marijuana?" 
(R. 249: 210). Levin responded "yes" (R. 249: 211). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Levin asserts that the court of appeals correctly determined that he was subjected 
to interrogation for Miranda purposes, but then erroneously concluded that he was not in 
custody for Miranda purposes. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at H I 1, 23. In reaching this 
decision, the court of appeals utilized a standard of review which afforded the trial court 
deference. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals correctly cited the four factors 
listed in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). However, because 
of the deference afforded the trial court, the court of appeals failed to adequately consider 
the four Carner factors in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances. This led the 
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court of appeals to erroneously affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to 
suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYED AN INCORRECT STANDARD 
OF REVIEW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL THAT 
LEVIN WAS NOT IN CUSTODY PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTIONS 
AFFORDED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 
Prior to trial, Levin filed a motion to suppress asserting that all statements which 
had been elicited pursuant to custodial interrogation should be suppressed because he was 
not advised of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination per Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), including his right to remain silent 
(R. 29-30).l After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion concluding that Levin was 
not "in custody", and was not subjected to interrogation, for Fifth Amendment and 
Miranda purposes (R. 72, 110-18). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. 
State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, 101 P.3d 846. 
Levin asserts that the court of appeals correctly determined that he was subjected 
to interrogation for Miranda purposes, but then erroneously concluded that he was not in 
custody for Miranda purposes. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at I f 11, 23. In reaching this 
decision, the court of appeals utilized a standard of review which afforded the trial court 
*Levin also renewed his suppression motion at the beginning of trial (R. 293: 7). 
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deference. 
A. The court of appeals erred in its application of a deferential standard of 
review. 
Levin asserts that the court of appeals erred in its choice of standard of review 
which granted the trial court deference in its application of fact to law. Levin, 2004 UT 
App 396 at f][7, 20, 21. In Levin, the court of appeals held that "because the 
determination of custody is fact-sensitive and '"the facts to which the legal rule is to be 
applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all 
these facts can be spelled out," we recognize that the trial court has a degree of discretion 
'unless such determination exceeds established legal boundaries.'" State v. Levin, 2004 
UT App 396, <H7, 20, 101 P.3d 846 (quoting State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah 
App. 1994) quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). While the court of 
appeals stated that it would give the trial court "a degree of discretion," Levin asserts that 
in fact the appeals court afforded the trial court at least "considerable discretion" in its 
application of the law to the underlying factual findings. Id. at f 21. The court of appeals 
stated that "the question of whether a police statement is so accusatory as to coerce a 
suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of degree for which the trial court is 
best suited to decide. Therefore ... we afford the trial court considerable discretion" Id. 
Levin asserts that this standard of review is in direct conflict with this Court's 
decisions and that there is a split in decisions from the court of appeals on what the 
correct standard of review should be in determining whether an individual is in custody 
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for purposes of Miranda protections. 
Levin asserts that this Court has typically applied a non-deferential standard for 
reviewing lower courts' ultimate legal decisions in regards to suppression 
motions-including motions to suppress pursuant to Miranda concerning Fifth 
Amendment violations. See, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998) (trial court's 
factual findings reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions reviewed for correctness); 
State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995) (factual findings reviewed for clear 
error while legal conclusions reviewed non-deferentially for correctness); State v. Wood, 
868 P.2d 70, 82 (Utah 1993) (trial court's determination of custody based on undisputed 
facts reviewed for correctness). 
Levin also asserts that the court of appeals has not consistently applied the same 
standard of review to Miranda issues. In fact, two distinct standards can be found in 
various decisions from the appeals court: 
One, some court of appeals decisions have adopted the same standard generally 
utilized by this Court in reviewing a trial court's decision in regards to suppression 
motions which is that the trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error while 
its ultimate legal conclusions are reviewed for non-deferentially for correctness. See, 
State v. Mired, 2002 UT App 291,18, 55 P.3d 1158; State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 
(Utah App. 1998); and State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103-04 (Utah App. 1990), cert, 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 
L.Ed.2d 507 (1992). 
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On the other hand, other decisions from the court of appeals have employed a 
deferential standard of review to Miranda issues. For example, in this case the court of 
appeals' utilization of a standard affording deference to the trial court was based on the 
same deferential standard set forth by the court of appeals in State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 
922 (Utah App. 1994). Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f7 ? Teuscher relied upon an 
interpretation of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994), wherein this Court 
discussed the standard of review generally applicable to mixed questions of law and fact. 
Furthermore, Levin asserts that in this case the court of appeals went far beyond 
affording "a degree of discretion" to the trial court as set forth in Teuscher and Pena. In 
its decision the appeals court cites language from Strausberg and Teuscher that trial 
courts are accorded "a measure of discretion" to the determination of custody for 
Miranda purposes because the issue is "fact sensitive." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at ^20 
(citations omitted). The court of appeals then states the conclusion from Strausberg that 
"the defendant was not in custody because the 'question was not coercive and was merely 
investigatory in nature.'" Id. (quoting Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 835). The court of appeals 
goes on to make the following statement: 
We agree that the question of whether a police statement is so accusatory as 
to coerce a suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of degree for which 
2The court of appeals also cites to its prior decision in State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 
831 (Utah App. 1993). Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at 120. The appeals court in Strausberg 
also relied on the same language from Pena cited by the appeals court in Teuscher. 
Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834 n.5. 
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the trial court is best suited to decide. [FN1] Therefore, in determining whether 
Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory that it would "affect how a reasonable 
person ... would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action," Stansbury, 511 
U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (quotations and citations omitted), we afford the trial 
court considerable discretion. 
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
"although the statement made by Deputy Keith was accusatory, it was not overly 
accusatory." Such a conclusion does not "exceed [ ] established legal boundaries," 
particularly because the Strausberg court reached a similar conclusion with similar 
facts. 895 P.2d at 834-35. As such, we rely on the trial court's determination that 
Deputy Keith's statement was not so accusatory as to coerce Levin into making an 
incriminating statement. 
Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at fP l -22 . In footnote 1 the appeals court quotes language 
from this Court in Pena concerning the superior position of trial courts to assess witness 
credibility and to weigh fact intensive considerations. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at n.l 
(quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 936). Levin takes issue with the discretion afforded by the 
court of appeals in this case for the following reasons: 
One, because the court of appeals granted the trial court total discretion-rather 
than a degree of discretion or even considerable discretion-in the determination of 
whether the officer's statement, viewed from a reasonable person standard, was "so 
accusatory as to coerce [Levin] into an unwanted confession." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 
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atffl21^22. 
Two, because the court of appeals takes this Court's language in Pena out of 
context. The Pena language utilized by the appeals court is not from a discussion 
concerning the application of law to fact as alluded to by the court of appeals, rather the 
language quoted and cited is from this Court's discussion in Pena which concerns a trial 
court's purely factual findings and its appUcable standard of "clear error." This Court's 
complete language in Pena is as follows: 
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of 
fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly 
erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the 
factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, 
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination. See Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 1\\ P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 
1985); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 
S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the trial 
court because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the 
evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be in the 
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the 
proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a 
cold record. In re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158,1161 (Utah 1983). 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. 
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Levin acknowledges that a trial court's factual findings are reviewed by appellate 
courts for clear error. However, the determination of whether a reasonable person given a 
set of facts would find a statement so accusatory as to affect "the breadth of... freedom of 
action" is not purely a factual determination. It is a mixed question of fact and law which 
requires that the underlying facts be applied to the appropriate legal standard. 
Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in granting the trial court total discretion in 
making this determination. 
This Court recently addressed a similar question in regards to the appropriate 
standard of review for appellate consideration of motions to suppress which arise out of a 
search and seizure context. In State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, <fll2, 103 P.3d 699, this Court, 
on certiorari review, adopted a non-deferential standard of review to highly fact sensitive 
Fourth Amendment issues. 
In Brake, the court of appeals applied a similar standard of review that the appeals 
court utilized in Levin. The court of appeals' in Brake employed the following standard 
of review: "[a] trial court's factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly 
erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some 
discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual 
findings." Id. a t ! 12 (quoting State v. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, f 11, 51 P.3d 31). This 
Court explicitly rejected the deferential standard for highly fact sensitive search and 
seizure cases. Id. at f 15. In so doing, it reviewed the opinion in Pena, and noted that 
Pena cited State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), wherein a non-deferential 
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standard was applied to consent cases. Id. at f 14. This Court also noted that in other 
highly fact sensitive cases, such as search incident to arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic 
stop, and protective searches, a non-deferential standard is applied. Id. at f 15. 
Levin asserts that the determination of whether a person is in custody for Miranda 
purposes is analogous to the determination of whether a search and seizure is lawful for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. Both issues present a mixed question of law and fact and 
Levin asserts that "while there were varying fact patterns that would be relevant to 
determinations of... [custody], they [are] not so unmanageable in their variety as to 
outweigh the interest in having uniform legal rules regarding ... [custody], given the 
substantial... [Fifth] Amendment interests lost as a result of such ... [admissions]." 
Brake, 2004 UT 95 at f 14 (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1271)). Levin asserts that this is particularly true because the framework for determining 
an individual's custodial status for Fifth Amendment protections has been consistently in 
place for more than twenty-years with this Court's decision in Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 
664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). See Wood, 868 P.2d at 82 n.2 ("[I]n Utah the appropriate 
standard for determining whether an interrogation prior to an arrest is custodial is that set 
out in Carrier."). Accordingly, Levin asserts that this Court should adopt the same 
standard of review for motions to suppress pursuant to Fifth Amendment protections as is 
now under Brake utilized in appellate review of suppression motions in a Fourth 
Amendment context. 
Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court recently addressed this identical question 
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concerning the applicable standard of review concerning a trial court's determination of a 
defendant's custodial status for Miranda purposes. Rosky v. State, — P.3d —, 2005 WL 
1242863 (Nev.). The Nevada court noted that its prior cases "have not consistently stated 
this court's standard of review" in regards to Miranda protections. 2005 WL 1242863 at 
1. The court also indicated that previously a "highly deferential" standard had been 
applied. Id. However, the court in Rosky, based upon decisions from the United States 
Supreme Court, determined that "a trial court's custody and voluntariness determinations 
present mixed questions of law and fact subject to this court's de novo review." Id. See, 
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995); and 
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-18, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). 
Accordingly the Rosky court employed a two-step analysis in its review of 
Miranda issues: 
The district court's purely historical factual findings pertaining to the "scene- and 
action-setting" circumstances surrounding an interrogation is entitled to deference 
and will be reviewed for clear error. However, the district court's ultimate 
determination of whether a person was in custody and whether a statement was 
voluntary will be reviewed de novo. Under Thompson and Miller, these decisions 
retain a "'uniquely legal dimension,'" requiring the "application of the controlling 
legal standard to the historical facts." 
Rosky, 2005 WL 1242863 at 1. Nevada courts also utilize the same factors adopted by 
this Court in Carrier for determining whether an interrogation prior to an arrest is 
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custodial. Id. at 2 (citation omitted). Those factors are: the site of the interrogation, 
whether the investigation is focused on the accused, the presence of objective indicia of 
arrest, and the length and form of the questioning. Id. 
The standard of review adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in Rosky is the 
same standard that has been consistently applied to suppression motions by this Court: a 
trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error while its ultimate legal 
determinations are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95,115 , 103 P.3d 699; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, <H 48, 51, 63 P.3d 650; 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998); State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 
1995); State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 82 (Utah 1993) State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1271 (Utah 1993). Levin asserts that this is the correct standard of review for appellate 
review of a trial court's Fifth Amendment custodial determinations. Accordingly, Levin 
asks that this Court overrule the decision of the court of appeals, and "take the occasion" 
to "abandon the standard which extended 'some deference' to the application of law to 
the underlying factual findings in Fifth Amendment issues involving Miranda protections 
"in favor of non-deferential review." See, Brake, 2004 UT 95 at f 15. 
B. The application of the wrong standard of review led the court of 
appeals to erroneously affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion 
to suppress. 
In deciding that Levin was not in custody, the court of appeals correctly cited the 
four factors listed in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983). 
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However, the court of appeals utilized the wrong standard of review. In addition, because 
of the deference afforded the trial court, the court of appeals failed to adequately consider 
the four Carrier factors in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances. This led the 
court of appeals to erroneously affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to 
suppress. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that defendants 
shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." To secure 
this fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court established procedural 
safeguards that must be followed during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Statements elicited by police during a 
custodial interrogation must be suppressed if a defendant has not been advised of his 
constitutional rights per Miranda. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,472 (Utah 1990). 
The standard for determining when a defendant is 'in custody' for Miranda 
purposes is well settled. "[T]he safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as 
soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal 
arrest.9" State v. MirqueU 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). "More 
specifically, Miranda warnings are required whenever the circumstances of an 
interrogation are such that they 'exert upon [the] detained person pressures that 
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require 
that he be warned of his constitutional rights.'" Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1146 (quoting 
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Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149). Additionally, "the proper inquiry as to 
whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable 
person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a 
degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah App. 
1993) (citations omitted). 
Utah Courts have repeatedly looked at four key factors in the determination of 
whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes: 1. The site of the interrogation. 
2. Whether the investigation focused on the accused. 3. Whether the objective indicia of 
arrest were present. 4. The length and form of the interrogation. Salt Lake City v. 
Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983). Whether a defendant is "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes "depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the 
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather than on the 
subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the examination." Mirquet, 914 
P.2d at 1147. Levin asserts that had the court of appeals used the correct standard of 
review his convictions would have been reversed. 
The court of appeals concluded that because Levin was interrogated on "a public 
road" as part of a traffic stop, the site and of the interrogation suggests that he was not in 
custody. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f 14. 
In support of its conclusion, the appeals court cited to Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed. 2d 317 (1984), for the proposition that "Traffic stops 
on a public road, even if in a relatively remote location, generally do not create the type of 
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situation in which 'the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.'" [Berkemer, 
468 U.S. at 438]. Also, the open setting of the road, unlike the confines of a police 
station or cruiser, reasonably 'diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, 
he will be subjected to abuse.' Id" Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at 114. 
However, the court of appeals' reliance on Berkemer is misplaced in this case. The 
language quoted by the court of appeals from Berkemer concerns "ordinary traffic 
stop[s].ff Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437. Levin asserts that his detention does not fall under 
the auspice of such a traffic stop. 
The public road on which Levin was detained is more secluded that the typical 
traffic stop. However, the court of appeals failed to mention that the public: road at issue 
is a dike road south of the Provo Boat Harbor and airport near Utah Lake (R. 292: 17-19, 
117 at \\). Moreover, Levin asserts that his detention was not akin to a typical traffic 
stop because of the level of police domination that was present. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
439. Levin was detained for more than a few minutes (R. 294: 61, 181). By the officer's 
own admission, Levin was not free to leave (R. 292: 21, 30). Two additional officers 
were called in as backup unlike Berkemer where only one officer briefly detained the 
defendant and asked him only a few questions. Additionally, Levin was questioned by 
multiple officers, given field sobriety tests by multiple officers, and was repeatedly 
questioned about drug use by multiple officers R. 292: 20, 26; 294: 33, 37,56-59, 61, 72-
73, 181, 183, 235). Moreover, Officer Keith felt it was necessary to read the Miranda 
warnings to the co-defendant, Johnson (R. 294: 41). The United States Supreme Court in 
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Berkemer recognized that "If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop 
thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody1 for practical purposes, he 
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." 468 U.S. at 440 
(citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)). 
Levin asserts that he was subjected to treatment by the officers during the traffic stop that 
rendered him in custody and entitled to Miranda protections. 
In addition, Levin was detained not for only "a few minutes" but for at least an 
hour (R. 294: 61, 181). Even the court of appeals recognized that "a stop for over an hour 
is more extensive than a routine traffic stop and, thereby, raises some concern that it may 
be intrusive enough to constitute custody." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f 15. However, 
the court of appeals disposed of its concerns for the length of the interrogation by saying 
that this fact alone is not "conclusive of custody." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at [^16. 
While the length of Levin's detention is not conclusive the custody determination, it 
certainly weighs in favor of a finding of custodial status to be weighed in the totality of 
the circumstances. 
In reaching its decision that Levin was not in custody, the court of appeals also 
relied on State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831 (Utah App 1995). Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at 
f 19. Strausberg involved an officer asking investigatory questions to a suspect after a 
car accident. The officer simply asked the defendant whether he had been involved in an 
accident in a certain area of town. Id. at 832. The defendant initially denied that he had 
been in that vicinity, then the officer told the defendant that witnesses at the scene 
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described a truck similar to his. Id. Without a Miranda warning, defendant admitted he 
had been at that location. Id. 
Levin asserts that this case is factually distinguishable from Strausberg. The Court 
of Appeals in Strausberg decided that the defendant was not subjected to custodial 
interrogation and that the investigatory questions were not accusatory. 895 P.2d at 835. 
Here, however, Deputy Keith's questions changed from investigatory in nature to a flat 
accusation that "there was no doubt in my mind that you've been smoking marijuana" (R. 
294: 37, 59). Moreover, Levin had been repeated questioned about drug use and had 
repeatedly denied such use R. 292: 26; 294: 33, 36-37, 59, 183). 
While the trial court decided that because this was a statement and not a question, 
Levin was not subjected to interrogation; the Court of Appeals correctly held that under 
the circumstances, Levin was definitely interrogated and Deputy Keith "should know ... 
[that it] was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Levin, 2004 UT App 
396 at H ' s 9, 11 (citation omitted). However, despite its correct finding that Levin was 
subjected to accusatory interrogation, the Court of Appeals did an about-face and held 
that the accusatory statement Deputy Keith made to Levin "was not overly accusatory ... 
as to coerce Levin into making an incriminating statement," even though the Court of 
Appeals had just stated that a reasonable officer would know such a statement would 
likely elicit an incriminating response. 2004 UT App 396 at f 22. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals side-stepped it responsibility of reviewing the trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness, and gave the (rial court "considerable 
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deference" on the question of the form of the interrogation. Id. at f 21. The Court of 
Appeals should have reviewed the trial court's factual findings with deference and then 
reviewed its legal conclusions for correctness. Instead, it merely repeated that the trial 
court found that "although the statement made by Deputy Keith was accusatory, it was not 
overly accusatory," and then held that it would defer to the trial court's conclusions. Id. at 
122. Levin asserts that the Court of Appeals' decision is in conflict with itself since at 
one point it found that Levin in fact was subjected to interrogation and that such 
interrogation was likely to elicit an incriminating response. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f 
11. 
Furthermore, whether the questioning was "overly accusatory" is not the relevant 
inquiry. In Carrier, this Court held that "An accused must be apprised of his Miranda 
rights if the setting is custodial or accusatory rather than investigatory. In other words, at 
the point the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's questions 
must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated further: 
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is 
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, 
the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but 
also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally 
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response. The latter portion of this definition focuses 
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primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 
(1980). See also Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991). Levin 
asserts that he was subjected to express questioning and accusations concerning drug use 
that was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 
Finally, Levin asserts that the case the court of appeals should have relied on is this 
Court's decision in State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). In Mirquet, this Court 
affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that the defendant was in custody for Miranda 
purposes. 914 P.2d at 1148. Mirquet was pulled over for a speeding violation. 914 P.2d 
at 1145. He subsequently, at the invitation of the officer, entered the police vehicle to 
view the speed reading on the radar unit. Id. Both the officer and defendant entered the 
vehicle. At this point, the officer detected an odor of marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The 
officer then confronted the defendant and stated: "It's obvious to me you've been 
smoking marijuana. You know, there's no question in my mind. Would you like to go to 
the car to get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get it?" Id. In response, the 
defendant retrieved the marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The officer subsequently searched 
the vehicle and found cocaine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. Accordingly, this 
Court held that the facts in light of the factors set forth in Carner support the ultimate 
conclusion that Mirquet was 'in custody.'" Id. 
Levin asserts that, like Mirquet, he was confronted by an officer "who made a 
direct accusation of illegal conduct" and that this case "does not involve an unarticulated 
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suspicion" focused on him but rather an accusation by an officer in which he "explicitly 
stated his conclusion of illegal conduct" and in effect, directed Levin to incriminate 
himself in order to end the detention. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147, 1148. Accordingly, 
Levin was entitled to receive the benefit of Miranda warnings prior to being so 
interrogated because investigative questioning turns to accusatory questioning when the 
police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it. Carrier, 664 P.2d at 1171. 
Levin asks this Court to correct the wrong conclusion reached by the court of 
appeals because of the deference it erroneously afforded the trial court by holding that he 
was in custody and entitled to the protections afforded pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 
C. The denial of Levin's motion to suppress was not harmless 
Levin asserts that the trial court's error of denying his motion to suppress 
statements obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"It is well established that the admission of statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda can be harmless error. For federal constitutional error to be held harmless, we 
must sincerely believe that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" State v. 
Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted). 
Moreover, "It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction even if the statement is excised from the record. It is inconsequential that a 
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retrial will most likely result in a conviction." Id. at 867. The evidence must be "so 
compelling that we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have 
reached the same verdict without learning of [the defendant's] incriminating statement." 
Id. 
The evidence linking Levin to these charges without his incriminating statements 
is too attenuated to support a conviction, let alone to reach a conclusion beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Officer's Orton and Beeder testified that they thought it was possible 
that Levin had smoked marijuana due to the results of his field sobriety tests (R. 294: 78-
79, 119). However, both officers admitted that the tests were inconclusive and were only 
partially complete and required blood and urine testing to make any accurate findings (R. 
294: 94, 97-98, 119,124). Moreover, Keith testified that he neither smelled marijuana 
nor found marijuana on Levin (R. 294: 56, 70). Furthermore, Keith thought there was 
insufficient evidence to arrest Levin for DUI even though Levin admitted to drinking two 
wine coolers and taking Lortab on an empty stomach (R. 292: 24; 294: 174, 185). 
And although Johnson told Keith that Levin had smoked with him, he also told 
Keith that he alone smoked and possessed the marijuana and that Levin did not possess 
the marijuana (R. 294: 42, 237-38). 
Without the incriminating statements, Levin asserts that he would not have been 
convicted and accordingly requests this Court to reverse his convictions, 
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CONCLUSION 
Levin asks that this Court reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
remand this matter back to the Fourth District with instructions that the matter is to be 
dismissed. 
SUBMITTED this 6th day of June, 2005. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Attorney for Appellee/Petitioner 
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State of Utah, 
Respondent, 
v. Case No. 20050001-SC 
Ralph Levin, 
Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on Jan 3, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of 
review in reviewing the district court's determination that the 
defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda protections -
A briefing schedule will issue hereafter. Pursuant to rule 
2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that permits 
the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their 
briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be permitted to 
stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The 
parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its 
issuance. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ralph LEVIN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20030336-CA. 
Nov. 4, 2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted, after a 
jury trial in the Fourth District Court, Provo 
Department, James R. Taylor, J., of possession or 
use of marijuana with prior conviction, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that: 
(1) officer's statement to defendant, that officer 
"knew [defendant] had smoked marijuana," was the 
functional equivalent of express questioning and 
therefore was "interrogation," as element for 
requiring Miranda warnings; but 
(2) defendant had not been in "custody," for 
Miranda purposes; and 
(3) defendant opened the door to admission, as 
impeachment evidence, of his prior felony drug 
conviction. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €^H34(3) 
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases 
11] Criminal Law €=>1158(4) 
110k 1158(4) Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing the trial court's denial of a defendant's 
motion to suppress, the appellate court examines the 
underlying factual findings for clear error, and 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based 
thereon for correctness. 
[2] Criminal Law €=>l 158(2) 
110kl 158(2) Most Cited Cases 
Because the determination of custody, for Miranda 
purposes, is fact-sensitive and the facts to which the 
legal rule is to be applied are so complex and 
varying that no rule adequately addressing the 
relevance of all the facts can be spelled out, 
appellate court recognizes that trial court has a 
degree of discretion unless such determination 
exceeds established legal boundaries. 
[3] Criminal Law €=>l 153(1) 
110kl 153(1) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's conclusion to admit defendant's prior 
felony conviction, as impeachment evidence, would 
be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 609. 
[4] Criminal Law €=^412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Criminal Law €=>412.2(3) 
110k412.2(3) Most Cited Cases 
Police officers must provide Miranda warnings 
prior to subjecting a suspect to a "custodial 
interrogation," which is defined as questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way. 
[5] Criminal Law €==>412.1(4) 
110k412.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Officer's statement to motorist, that officer "knew 
[motorist] had smoked marijuana," was the 
functional equivalent of express questioning and 
therefore was "interrogation," as element for 
requiring Miranda warnings; statement was made in 
course of express questioning to which motorist had 
already responded, and officer should have known 
the statement was reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. 
[6] Criminal Law €^412.2(2) 
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101 P.3d 846, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2004 UT App 396 
(Cite as: 101 P.3d 846, 2004 UT App 396) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Motorist was not in "custody," for Miranda 
purposes, when officer elicited motorist's 
incriminating statement that he had smoked 
marijuana; objective indicia of arrest were missing, 
interrogation occurred on public road, officer's 
statement that he "knew" motorist had used drugs 
was not so accusatory that it would cause 
reasonable person to feel his freedom of action had 
been significantly limited, and although encounter 
lasted over an hour, 
such time frame was not unreasonable, as car had 
two occupants in addition to motorist and law 
enforcement support personnel had to travel to 
scene. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[7] Criminal Law €^>412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Miranda does not require law enforcement officers 
to warn suspects before interrogation in all cases; 
rather, Miranda requirements apply only when the 
suspect is subject to formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest. 
[8] Criminal Law €=>412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Whether events surrounding an interrogation 
amount to custody, so that Miranda warnings are 
required, depends on the objective circumstances 
and not on the subjective views harbored by either 
the interrogating officer or the person being 
questioned. 
[9] Criminal Law €^>412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, the court determines whether the 
defendant was in custody, for Miranda purposes, 
with reference to four factors: (1) the site of 
interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused 
on the defendant; (3) whether objective indicia of 
arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of 
interrogation. 
[10] Criminal Law €=>412.2(2) 
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases 
In deciding the custody issue, as element for 
requiring Miranda warnings, the totality of the 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C 
Page 2 
circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is 
dispositive. 
[11] Criminal Law€^>519(9) 
110k519(9) Most Cited Cases 
The question of whether a police statement is so 
accusatory as to coerce a suspect into an unwanted 
confession is a question of degree which the trial 
court is best suited to decide. 
[12] Witnesses €^ =>406 
410k406 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's testimony, in drug possession 
prosecution, that "I don't smoke marijuana" and "I 
haven't smoked marijuana," opened the door to 
admission, as impeachment evidence, of defendant's 
prior felony drug conviction. Rules of Evid., Rule 
609. 
[13] Witnesses €==>406 
410k406 Most Cited Cases 
When a defendant testifies that he has never used 
drugs, a trial court does not abuse its discretion 
when it allows the prosecution to present evidence 
of the defendant's prior conviction for drug 
possession, as impeachment evidence. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 609. 
[14] Witnesses €^>406 
410k406 Most Cited Cases 
When a defendant seeks to mischaracterize a prior 
conviction, the court does not abuse its discretion in 
allowing the State to use prior conviction evidence 
as impeachment evidence to directly contradict the 
defendant's previous inaccurate testimony. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 609. 
*847 Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, for Appellant. 
Carlyle Kay Bryson and Nyal C. Bodily, Provo, for 
Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, P.J., JACKSON and THORNE 
,JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
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**1 Ralph Levin challenges his conviction for 
possession or use of marijuana with a prior 
conviction under Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
and for possession of drug paraphernalia under 
Utah Code section 58-37a-5(l). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 In May 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was 
patrolling along the Provo Dike Road when he 
noticed that the registration tags of a convertible car 
parked on the side of the road were expired. He 
pulled up behind the car and walked to the car on 
foot to notify its three occupants. The car's 
convertible roof was down, and, while standing 
beside the car, Deputy Keith noticed several open 
containers in plain view and asked the occupants for 
identification. Upon a subsequent search of the 
vehicle, he found a "socket" tool that had been used 
to smoke marijuana and several small bags 
containing marijuana in a backpack. Deputy Keith 
radioed for drug recognition officers to assist at the 
scene. When the officers arrived they conducted 
several field sobriety tests that indicated that the 
driver, Levin, had been smoking marijuana. When 
Deputy Keith asked Levin if he had been smoking 
marijuana, Levin responded *848 that he had not. 
At some point, Deputy Keith stated that he knew 
Levin had been smoking marijuana, to which Levin 
responded he had. 
**3 Levin was cited for possession or use of 
marijuana with a prior conviction, in violation of 
Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of 
Utah Code section 58- 37a-5(l) (1998). He pleaded 
not guilty to both counts. 
**4 Before trial, Levin moved to suppress 
statements he made at the time of his citation, 
claiming that Deputy Keith had subjected him to 
custodial interrogation without informing him of his 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The court 
denied the motion on May 22, 2002. 
**5 Prior to trial, Levin also moved to exclude 
evidence of a prior conviction for possession or use 
of marijuana and moved to bifurcate the matter of 
his prior conviction. The trial court granted both 
motions on May 14, 2002. However, during his 
direct examination at trial, Levin stated that "1 don't 
smoke marijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana." 
Before cross-examination, the State asked the court 
to rule on the admissibility of Levin's prior drug 
conviction in light of the statements he had made 
during direct examination. The court concluded 
that Levin's statements had "opened the door" and 
permitted the State to admit evidence of Levin's 
prior drug conviction under rule 609 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. At the conclusion of evidence, 
the judge read an instruction explaining that the jury 
could only consider the prior conviction evidence 
for assessing credibility. 
**6 The jury convicted Levin on both counts. On 
appeal, Levin challenges the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress and the court's ruling to 
permit evidence of prior crimes. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] **7 " 'In reviewing the trial court's denial of 
[a defendant's] motion to suppress, we examine the 
underlying factual findings for clear error, and 
review the trial court's conclusions of law based 
thereon for correctness.' " State v. Alfred, 2002 UT 
App 291,H 8, 55 P.3d 1158 (quoting State v. Hayes, 
860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). However, 
because the determination of custody is 
fact-sensitive and " 'the facts to which the legal rule 
is to be applied are so complex and varying that no 
rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these 
facts can be spelled out,' " we recognize that the 
trial court has a degree of discretion "unless such 
determination exceeds established legal 
boundaries." State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)) (other citations 
omitted). 
[3] **8 With regard to the court's determination to 
admit evidence of Levin's prior conviction, we 
review the trial court's conclusion for abuse of 
discretion. See Jensen v. Intermountain Power 
Agency, 1999 UT I0,1f 12, 977 P.2d 474 ("[I]n 
reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence, we allow for broad discretion."). 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Motion to Suppress 
A. Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
**9 The trial court entered the following findings 
of fact in its May 22, 2002 order denying Levin's 
motion to suppress: 
1. On May 2, 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was 
patrolling Provo Dike Road that is located just 
south of the Provo Boat Harbor. This is a public 
road. 
2. Deputy Keith observed a convertible vehicle 
that was parked on the side of the road. Deputy 
Keith noticed that the registration was expired on 
the vehicle and subsequently stopped his vehicle 
behind the parked convertible. Deputy Keith did 
not activate his overhead lights or his siren when 
he parked behind the vehicle. Furthermore, he 
did not block their vehicle from moving or 
leaving with the position of his vehicle. 
3. Deputy Keith observed three occupants sitting 
in the car. 
4. Deputy Keith approached the vehicle on foot 
and observed several open containers of alcohol 
in plain view in both the *849 front and rear area 
of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
5. Deputy Keith asked for the three passenger's 
[sic] identification. Defendant was determined to 
be the individual sitting in the driver's seat. 
6. Deputy Keith asked the occupants to step out 
of the vehicle and [explained] that he was going 
to search for more open containers. 
7. Deputy Keith began searching the vehicle for 
open containers. In the center console, which 
was large enough to house an open container, 
Deputy Keith smelled the odor of marijuana and 
observed a metal "socket" that was fashioned into 
a pipe. The socket smelled of marijuana and 
appeared to have marijuana residue in the "pipe." 
8. In a back-pack in the back seat, Deputy Keith 
found three plastic bags that were determined to 
contain marijuana. The rear[-] seated passenger 
stated it was his back-pack. 
9. Deputy Keith asked Defendant about the 
socket that was found in the center console 
between the driver's and passenger seat[s]. 
Defendant stated he did not know it was there and 
insisted that he had not smoked any marijuana. 
At this time, Defendant was not under arrest nor 
was he handcuffed. 
10. Within a short time, two other officers 
arrived. Because Defendant was in the driver's 
seat, Defendant was asked to perform some field 
sobriety tests. 
11. The officer that conducted the field sobriety 
tests on Defendant, Deputy Todd Orton, was a 
certified Drug Recognition Expert. After the 
conclusion of the field sobriety tests, Deputy 
Orton believed Defendant was possibly under the 
influence of marijuana; however, it was felt that 
he was not impaired to the poini that he could not 
safely operate a motor vehicle. 
12. Deputy Orton informed Deputy Keith of his 
belief that the Defendant was possibly under the 
influence of marijuana but that he was not 
impaired to the point that he could not safely 
operate a motor vehicle. 
13. Deputy Keith then told Defendant that he 
"knew he had smoked marijuana." This was not 
phrased in the form of a question. Furthermore, 
no evidence was elicited on cross-examination 
that Deputy Keith made this comment while 
confronting the Defendant or while "in his face." 
No evidence was attained that was anything more 
than a statement casually made to Defendant. 
14. Up to this point, Defendant had maintained a 
lack of knowledge of the marijuana or the pipe. 
However, Defendant then told Deputy Keith that 
he had only taken a couple of hits of marijuana 
while at that location. He stated that both he and 
the back seated passenger had smoked out of a 
pipe. 
15. Deputy Keith was surprised when Defendant 
stated he had smoked marijuana while at that 
location. Deputy Keith testified that he did not 
expect Defendant to say anything in response. 
Deputy Keith did not even ask a question and was 
surprised when Defendant responded with an 
incriminating statement. 
16. Defendant, along with the other occupants of 
the vehicle, was never arrested, never handcuffed 
and was merely given a citation. Defendant was 
then allowed to drive the vehicle away from the 
location with his friends as passengers. 
Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that 
Levin was neither in custody nor subject to 
interrogation such that Deputy Keith was required 
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to provide him with a Miranda warning. In his 
appeal, Levin does not dispute these factual 
findings; rather, he claims that the court "erred in 
its conclusion that [he] was not in custody or 
subject to interrogation for Miranda purposes." 
B. Miranda Warnings 
[4] **10 Police officers must provide Miranda 
warnings prior to subjecting a suspect to a 
"custodial interrogation," which is defined as 
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
*850 1. Interrogation 
[5] **11 As an initial matter, we disagree with the 
trial court's determination that Keith's questions did 
not result in an "interrogation" for purposes of 
Miranda. The Supreme Court has defined 
"interrogation" to comprise "not only ... express 
questioning, but also ... any words or actions on the 
part of police (other than those normally attendant 
to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Thus, 
statements by police "to which no response from the 
respondent [are] invited" do not constitute an 
"interrogation." Id. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682. 
However, a "lengthy harangue in the presence of the 
suspect" may amount to an interrogation. Id. at 
303, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Although Keith's statement to 
Levin may not have been punctuated with a 
question mark, it was made in the course of express 
questioning to which Levin had already responded. 
Given this context, Keith's assertion was a type 
Keith "should know [was] reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response" from Levin. Id. at 302, 
100 S.Ct. 1682. Thus, we must conclude that the 
statement was the "functional equivalent" to express 
questioning and, therefore, an "interrogation." Id. 
at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. 
2. Custody 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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[6][7][8] **12 Nonetheless, we agree with the irial 
court's determination that Levin was not in 
"custody" at the time the interview took place. 
Miranda does not require law enforcement officers 
to warn suspects before interrogation in all cases. 
Rather, Miranda requirements only apply when the 
suspect is subject to " 'formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest.' " Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 
318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526,128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) 
(per curiam) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 
U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 
(1983)) (other quotations and citation omitted). 
Whether events surrounding an interrogation 
amount to custody depends on the "objective 
circumstances" and "not on the subjective views 
harbored by either the interrogating officer[ ] or the 
person being questioned." Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct. 
1526. 
[9][10] **13 Under Utah law, we determine 
whether a suspect was in custody with reference to 
four factors: " '(1) the site of interrogation; (2) 
whether the investigation focused on the accused; 
(3) whether objective indicia of arrest were present; 
and (4) the length and form of interrogation.' " 
State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting Salt Lake City v. Corner, 664 P.2d 1168, 
1171 (Utah 1983)). "We emphasize that " 'in 
deciding the custody issue, the totality of the 
circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is 
dispositive.' " State v. Worthington, 970 P.2d 714, 
716 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting Stansbury, 511 
U.S. at 321, 114 S.Ct. 1526) (alteration omitted). 
**14 We begin by listing those factors that suggest 
Levin was not in custody. First, the objective 
indicia of arrest are missing: there were no "readied 
handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." Carner, 
664 P.2d at 1171. Second, the site of the 
interrogation was a public road. Traffic stops on a 
public road, even if in a relatively remote location, 
generally do not create the type of situation in 
which "the motorist feels completely at the mercy of 
the police." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
438, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Also, 
the open setting of the road, unlike the confines of a 
police station or cruiser, reasonably "diminishes the 
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motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will 
be subjected to abuse " Id 
**15 We now turn to those factors that could 
sustain a determination that Levin was in custody 
Levin's argument focuses primarily on the duration 
of the encounter, which he describes at one point as 
lasting an hour and at another point as lasting an 
hour and a half Generally, traffic stops are 
afforded a presumption of validity because they are 
"temporary and brief in nature and the suspect 
knows that "m the end he will most likely be 
allowed to continue on his way" Id at 437, 104 
S Ct 3138 Here, however, a stop for over an hour 
is more extensive than a routine traffic stop and, 
thereby, raises some concern that it may be intrusive 
enough to constitute custody 
*851 **16 In determining at what point a stop 
begins to assume the character of an arrest, we note 
that the Supreme Court has rejected bright-line time 
limits to police stops " '[W]e question the wisdom 
of a rigid time limitation Such a limit would 
undermine the equally important need to allow 
authonties to graduate their responses to the 
demands of any particular situation' " United 
States v Sharpe, 470 US 675, 686, 105 S Ct 
1568, 84 LEd2d 605 (1985) (quoting United 
States v Place, 462 U S 696, 709 n 10, 103 S Ct 
2637, 77 LEd2d 110 (1983)) We too are 
reluctant to conclude that the mere fact that a stop 
lasted over an hour is conclusive of custody 
**17 Rather, we consider the reasonableness of 
the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances 
We have recognized that investigative stops 
involving several suspects must be afforded 
additional time See State v Allred, 2002 UT App 
291,f 13, 55 P 3d 1158 (questioning six suspects 
for up to forty minutes does not constitute custody) 
Similarly, it is reasonable for a stop to require over 
an hour when an officer calls support personnel who 
must travel to the scene See State v Gar butt, 173 
Vt 277, 790 A 2d 444, 449- 50 (2001) (holding 
that detaining suspect for seventy-five minutes 
while awaiting support personnel did not constitute 
custody), People v Forster, 29 CalApp4th 1746, 
35 CalRptr2d 705, 709-10 (1994) (holdmg that 
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detaining suspect for "a little more than an hour" 
while awaiting support personnel did not constitute 
custody) Here, although Levin was detained for 
over an hour, that amount of time was not 
unreasonable given the circumstances The officers 
were dealing with thiee suspects at the scene and 
had to perform a number of tasks, which included 
(1) collecting identification from each suspect, (2) 
investigating and collecting evidence regarding a 
possible open container violation (3) investigating 
and collecting evidence regarding possible drug 
possession and use, (4) summormg and awaiting 
support officers trained in drug recognition, (5) 
performing field sobriety tests or each suspect for 
alcohol and drug consumption, and (6) preparing 
citations Taken together, a stop lasting over an 
hour under these circumstances is not unreasonable 
**18 Levin next argues that he was m "custody" 
because he was the focus ol Deputy Keith's 
investigation and because Deputy Keith directly 
accused him of using drugs We recognize that "a 
police officer's subjective view that the individual 
under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does 
not bear upon the question of custody for purposes 
of Miranda" Stansbury v California, 511 U S 
318, 324, 114 SCt 1526, 128 LEd2d 293 (1994) 
(per curiam) However, when a police officei 
expresses his suspicions to a suspect, "[t]hose 
beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they 
would affect how a reasonable person m the 
position of the individual being questioned would 
gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action " 
Id at 325, 114 SCt 1526 (quotations and citation 
omitted) Thus, "[e]\en a clear statement from an 
officer that the person under mterrogation is a prime 
suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody 
issue The weight and pertinence of any 
communications regarding the officer's degree of 
suspicion will depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case " Id 
**19 Here, then, we must determine whether 
Deputy Keith's assertion that he knew Levin had 
used drugs would cause a reasonable person m 
Levm's position to feel his "freedom of action" had 
been significantly limited See id On this issue, 
the facts of this case are largely analogous to those 
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of State v Strausberg 895 P 2d 831 (Utah 
Ct App 1995) There, the defendant fled from the 
scene of an accident he had caused, and police used 
descriptions provided by witnesses to later identify 
and stop him See id at 832 After observing 
evidence of the collision on the vehicle, a police 
officer asked the defendant if he had been m an 
accident that night See id The defendant denied 
any involvement See id Without giving a Miranda 
warning, the officer explained that witnesses had 
identified a similar vehicle at the scene of the 
accident, and, confronted with this information, the 
driver made incriminating statements See id 
**20 In determining whether the defendant was in 
custody, the Strausberg court held that " '[b]ecause 
the determination of custody for Miranda purposes 
is fact sensitive, we *852 accord a measure of 
discretion to the trial court's determination unless 
such determination exceeds established legal 
boundaries' " Id at 834 n 5 (quotmg State v 
Teuscher 883 P 2d 922, 929 (Utah Ct App 1994)) 
The court then concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion m concluding the defendant was 
not in custody because the "question was not 
coercive and was merely investigatory in nature " 
Id at 835 
[11] **21 We agree that the question of whether a 
police statement is so accusatory as to coerce a 
suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of 
degree for which the trial court is best suited to 
decide [FN1] Therefore, in determining whether 
Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory that it 
would "affect how a reasonable person would 
gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action," 
Stansbury 511 US at 325, 114 S Ct 1526 
(quotations and citations omitted), we afford the 
trial court considerable discretion 
FN1 The trial court is m a superior 
position to weight fact-intensive 
considerations because "it is before that 
court that the witnesses and parties appear 
and the evidence is adduced" State v 
Pena 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
Thus, "[t]he judge of that court is therefore 
considered to be in the best position to 
© 2005 Thomson/West No C 
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assess the credibility of witnesses and to 
derive a sense of the proceeding as a 
whole, somethmg an appellate court cannot 
hope to garner from a cold record " Id 
**22 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that "although the 
statement made by Deputy Keith was accusatory, it 
was not overly accusatory " Such a conclusion does 
not "exceed [ ] established legal boundaries," 
particularly because the Stiausberg court reached a 
sunilar conclusion with similar facts 895 P 2d at 
834-35 As such, we rely on the trial court's 
determination that Deputy Keith's statement was not 
so accusatory as to coerce Levin into making an 
incriminating statement 
**23 Based on these considerations, we conclude 
that the totality of the circumstances in this case 
weigh against a determination that Levm was in 
"custody" for Miranda purposes Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to 
suppress 
II Admissibility of Prior Conviction Evidence 
[12] **24 Prior to trial, Levin also moved to 
exclude evidence of a prior conviction for 
possession or use of marijuana and moved to 
bifurcate the matter of the prior conviction The 
trial court granted both motions on May 14, 2002 
However, during the May 22, 2002 trial, the 
following exchange took place during Levin's direct 
examination 
Q Okay Did [Deputy Keith] ask you any other 
questions at that point? 
A I don't remember 
Q Did he ask you if you had been smoking 
marijuana 
A He did 
Q atthat point? 
A Yes, he did He asked me if I had been 
smoking, if it was mine, and I told him it's not 
mine, and I don't smoke marijuana, and I haven't 
smoked marijuana 
Before the State began its cross examination, it 
asked the court to allow it to question Levin 
regarding his prior drug conviction After a brief 
hearing, the trial court determined that Levm had 
to Ong U S Govt Works 
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"opened the door" to such evidence when he 
"misled the jury and left the jury with a potential 
false impression" by testifying that "I don't smoke 
marijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana." On 
cross-examination, Levin admitted his prior drug 
conviction, and, at the conclusion of evidence, the 
court instructed the jury to consider the prior 
conviction evidence only for the purpose of 
weighing credibility. 
**25 Evidence of a prior conviction for a crime 
punishable in excess of one year is admissible under 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence "if the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs it prejudicial 
effect to the accused." Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). 
Rule 403 also applies to exclude evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. As 
mentioned above, we review the trial court's ruling 
on these evidentiary matters only for abuse of 
discretion. See *853 Jensen v. Intermountain 
Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,1 ^ , 977 P.2d 474. 
[13][14] **26 When a defendant testifies that he 
has never used drugs, a trial court does not abuse its 
discretion when it allows the prosecution to present 
evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for 
drug possession. See Gee v. Pride, 992 F.2d 159, 
161-62 (8th Cir.1993) (admitting evidence of prior 
conviction for drug possession after defendant 
testified he had never used PCP) (construing 
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)). Similarly, when a defendant 
seeks to mischaracterize a prior conviction, the 
court does not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
State to use prior conviction evidence "to directly 
contradict the defendant's previous inaccurate 
testimony." State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 824 
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (admitting evidence of cocaine 
use relating to prior attempted forgery conviction); 
see also United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 616, 
619 (8th Cir.1995) (admitting details of past drug 
conviction when defendant "attempted to minimize 
his guilt regarding the prior conviction") 
(construing Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)). 
**27 In the present case, the court did not abuse 
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its discretion in determining that Levin's statements 
that "I don't smoke marijuana' and "I haven't 
smoked marijuana" could mislead jurors. Nor did it 
abuse its discretion when it concluded that the prior 
conviction evidence would have substanlial 
probative value in clarifying the record and 
remedying any mischaracterizations. Finally, the 
court limited any improper prejudicial effect by 
instructing the jury to consider the evidence only for 
purposes of credibility. 
CONCLUSION 
**28 We conclude that the trial court did not en in 
denying Levin's motion to suppress and did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Levin's 
prior drug conviction at trial. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
**29 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., 
Judge. 
101 P.3d 846, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2004 UT 
App 396 
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OF LAW, ORDER 
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HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before this Court on January 16, 2002, for a hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. Defendant Ralph Levin was present and represented by Jennifer Gowans. 
The State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, John J. Easton. The Court, having 
heard testimony from the lead officer, Deputy Wayne Keith, allowed Defendant additional time to 
conduct additional research and file a supplemental brief supporting her initial Motion to 
Suppress. Oral argument was heard on February 13, 2002. Defendant had filed a supplemental 
brief and was again represented by Jennifer Gowans. The State was represented by John J. 
Easton. Having heard the relevant testimony and oral arguments on this matter, the Court does 
hereby make and enter the following Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
I:B 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
The following facts were established at the Suppression Hearing held in this matter that 
was conducted on January 16, 2002' 
1. On May 2, 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was patrolling Provo Dike Road that is 
located just south of the Provo Boat Harbor. This is a public road. 
2. Deputy Keith observed a convertible vehicle that was parked on the side of the 
road. Deputy Keith noticed that the registration was expired on the vehicle and 
subsequently stopped his vehicle behind the parked convertible. Deputy Keith did 
not activate his overhead lights or his siren when he parked behind the vehicle. 
Furthermore, he did not block their vehicle from moving or leaving with the 
position of his vehicle. 
3. Deputy Keith observed three occupants sitting in the car. 
4. Deputy Keith approached the vehicle on foot and observed several open containers 
of alcohol in plain view in both the front and rear area of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle. 
5. Deputy Keith asked for the three passenger's identification. Defendant was 
determined to be the individual sitting in the driver's seat. 
6. Deputy Keith asked the occupants to step out of the vehicle and that he was going 
to search for more open containers. AMhaWime^eputy^K^h-^alted-4^i^ba^k-up-/ n^j 
%£&eers— 
7. Deputy Keith began searching the vehicle for open containers. In the center 
console, which was large enough to house an open container, Deputy Keith 
smelled the odor of marijuana and observed a metal "socket" that was fashioned 
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into a pipe The socket smelled of marijuana and appeared to have marijuana 
residue in the "pipe " 
8. In a back-pack in the back seat, Deputy Keith found three plastic bags that were 
determined to contain marijuana The rear seated passenger stated it was his back-
pack. 
9. Deputy Keith asked Defendant about the socket that was found in the center ^ ^ 
m4r ''A' 
console between the driver's and passenger seat. Defendant stated he-d^khow it 
was there and insisted that he had not smoked any marijuana. At this time, 
Defendant was not under arrest nor was he handcuffed. 
10. Within a short time, two other officers arrived. Because Defendant was in the 
driver's seat, Defendant was asked to perform some field sobriety tests 
11. The officer that conducted the field sobriety tests on Defendant, Deputy Todd 
Orton, was a certified Drug Recognition Expert. After the conclusion of the field 
sobriety tests, Deputy Orton believed Defendant was mest4ifeely tinder the 
influence of marijuana, however, it was felt that he was not impaired to the point 
that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle. 
12. Deputy Orton informed Deputy Keith of his belief that the Defendant was-hkel^ ~^ 
under the influence of marijuana but that he was not impaired to the point that he 
could not safely operate a motor vehicle. 
13. Deputy Keith then told Defendant that he "knew he had smoked marijuana " This 
was not phrased in the form of a question. Furthermore, no evidence was elicited 
on cross-examination that Deputy Keith made this comment while confronting the 
Defendant or while "in his face " No evidence was attained that this was anything 
more than a statement casually made to Defendant. 
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14. Up to this point, Defendant had maintained a lack of knowledge of the marijuana 
or the pipe. However, Defendant then told Deputy Keith that he had only taken a 
couple hits of marijuana while at that location. He stated that both he and the back 
seated passenger had smoked out of a pipe. 
15. Deputy Keith was surprised when Defendant stated he had smoked marijuana 
while at that location Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect Defendant to 
say anything in response. Deputy Keith did not even ask a question and was 
surprised when Defendant responded with an incriminating statement. 
16. Defendant, along with the other occupants of the vehicle, was never arrested, 
never handcuffed and was merely given a citation. Defendant was then allowed to 
drive the vehicle away from that location with his friends as passengers. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY 
The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom 
of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996) However, a "person may be seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes but not be in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). Whether one is "in custody'1 for Miranda purposes 
depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the 
compulsory nature of the interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the 
oflBcers conducting the examination, [citation omitted] Id, at 1147. Particularly, in the context of 
a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, even though they have been stopped and, at 
least momentarily, are not free to leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). 
During a routine traffic stop even if an officer engages in some degree of accusatory 
questioning of the driver during the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a 
subjective, unstated intent to arrest the driver, the person is not "in custody" for purposes of the 
Fifth Amendment. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 
1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). 
Because Defendant was not placed in handcuffs, restrained in the police vehicle, or 
restrained in any physical way other than being stopped for various violations he was never placed 
in formal arrest. Because Defendant was never formally arrested, this Court had to determine 
whether Defendant was in "custody" requiring the safeguards against self incrimination through a 
Miranda warning. 
There are occasions when a defendant is entitled to & Miranda warning prior to a formal 
arrest; therefore, to determine when an individual is "in custody" the Utah Supreme Court has 
outlined four factors. Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). To determine 
whether an individual is in custody, courts must look to (1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether 
the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; 
and (4) the length and form of interrogation. A/, at 1171. 
(1) Defendant was questioned while on the side of the road by his vehicle. He 
was never questioned while at the police station, jail or while inside the 
squad car. Defendant was always outside on a public road with his 
passenger friends during this entire episode. 
(2) The investigation did not focus solely on the accused. Defendant was one 
of three individuals that were stopped and cited that night. Both 
passengers of the vehicle were cited for either marijuana or open 
containers. Furthermore, the investigation focused on all three individuals. 
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(3) There were no objective indicia of arrest present. Defendant was never 
handcuffed. Defendant was never placed in a squad car. Defendant stood 
on the side of the road next to his vehicle with his friends the entire time. 
Defendant was conversing with his friends during this time. Vehicle sirens 
and lights were not used by Deputy Keith. Defendant even drove away 
from the scene. Defendant performed field sobriety tests; however, he was 
not under arrest and could have refused to comply with any of those 
requests. 
(4) The length and form of interrogation was not inherently long. It was never 
elicited on direct or cross-examination exactly how long the detention 
lasted. Furthermore, the "interrogation" was not even in the form of a 
question and was only an accusatory statement. 
Although "the accusatory nature of questioning is a relevant factor in determining whether 
a person is in custody, . . . it is not dispositive of the issue. Moreover, whether the interrogating 
officer entertains subjective suspicions that the subject has committed a crime is irrelevant." State 
v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah 1996). "Although many encounters between citizens and 
police, especially in the context of a traffic stop, can give rise to accusatory-type questioning, that 
factor alone does not dispositively determine whether a person is in custody." Id, at 1148. 
The mere fact that Defendant is asked to perform field sobriety tests and that there are 
three officers present does not amount to a determination that the Defendant is in "custody" 
requiring a Miranda warning. Furthermore, although the statement made by Deputy Keith was 
accusatory, it was not overly accusatory. Defendant had maintained a lack of knowledge of any 
drugs, marijuana or paraphernalia. Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect Defendant to 
answer him when he told Defendant that "he knew he had been smoking marijuana." Deputy 
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Keith was surprised when Defendant subsequently stated that he had smoked marijuana that night 
while parked there. 
Since a "traffic stop is substantially less police dominated" than typical interrogation the 
"noncoercive aspect of traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant 
to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 440 (1984); State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1222 (Utah 1987) 
In analyzing the four factors established by the Utah Supreme Court in Carrier the facts 
of this case do not lead to the determination that Defendant was in custody at the time he 
admitted to smoking marijuana Defendant was on the side of the road and not in the police car, 
the investigation was not focused solely on the Defendant, there were no objective indicia of 
arrest as Defendant was never arrested, handcuffed or physically restrained and Deputy Keith's 
statement was not a "form of interrogation." 
The Court hereby finds that Defendant was not in custody at the time he made 
incriminating statements and Defendant's motion is denied. 
B. DEFENDANT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO INTERROGATION WHEN HE 
ADMITTED SMOKING MARIJUANA 
Defendant was not subject to interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation at 
the time he admitted smoking marijuana. 
InMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Supreme Court held that "the 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Subsequently, in Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court 
held that the safeguards of Miranda are required whenever a person in custody is subjected to 
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either express questioning or its "functional equivalent.5' Rhode Island v. Inms, 446 U.S 291, 
301 (1980). That court went on to define the "functional equivalent" of interrogation as, 
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest or custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect. Id, at 301. 
Deputy Keith's statement was not phrased in the form of a question. He merely stated 
that he knew the Defendant had smoked marijuana. Up until this point, the Defendant had denied 
smoking any marijuana; therefore, it is very reasonable to believe that the Defendant would either 
not respond or would maintain his denial. This mere statement was not a question that Deputy 
Keith "knew or should know was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" from the 
Defendant. Deputy Keith even testified that he was surprised when Defendant made an 
incriminating response by stating he had smoked marijuana that night. 
"[VJolunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their 
admissibility is not affected by [Miranda]" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). This 
confession was not in response to interrogation. Defendant was not asked a question. Deputy 
Keith did not expect Defendant to respond to his statement. Deputy Keith was not coercive in his 
statement. He was not threatening Defendant or telling him that he would charge him with the 
crimes anyway. 
Accordingly, although not dispositive due to the finding that the Defendant was not in 
custody at the time he made incriminating statements, this Court holds that not only was 
Defendant not in custody but he was also not subject to interrogation. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders 
that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED 
Signed this £2 day of /ff#</ , 2002 w 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form 
A 
tniferK Go wans * Jennif 
Attorney for Defendant 
John J J^aston 
Attorney for Plaintiff State of Utah 
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